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CREATING BORDERS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT
OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN WAR
ON THE LOCAL POPULATION
by Jon Abbink (*)
Introduction
On 12 December 2000, the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea met m
Algiers, smiled, shook hands and signed a peace accord after more than
two years of extremely bloody battles and quite insulting propaganda
warfare. This deal was unexpected, and prepared completely away from
the public view of the Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples. In view of the
huge rift created between the two countries and of the feeling of enmity
that both leaders expressed vis-à-vis each other during the two-and-a-
half years of fighting, and recalling the intensity of the war, after one
year the question can be asked what the chances are for normalization
or peace between these two "brother countries" H
It is true that the December deal paved the way for negotiations
and perhaps for a delmeation of the border, and also that it initiated a
phase of 'reconstruction'. Indeed, m the present conjuncture of events
it is incumbent on every-one to again look for hopeful signs for peace,
reconciliation and overall development. But one cannot help feeling that
the instant praise songs given in December 2000 by former Us president
Clinton, UN secretary-General Kofi Annan, former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and others on this provisional accord sounded a bit
( ) Afncan Studie* Centre, Letden
(1) See K TRONVOLL & TEKESTE NEGASH, Brothers at war makmg sensé ofthe Entrean-
Ethiopian war, Oxford, James Currey and Athens (Ohio), Ohio University Press, pp 179
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hollow and facile after two years of preventable war.(2) The immédiate
trust they again put in thé two parties is somewhat misplaced. One may
still remember thé uncritical appraisals o£ thé so-called 'new leaders' o£
both countries in thé years before thé war started on May 1998,
assessments based on sand and not on serious knowledge of the local
situation. (3)
The Horn of Africa seems to be characterized by unbuilt, permanent
instability. What is the basic reason for this instability? No doubt the
common fond is enduring poverty, ecological crisis and compétition for
scarce resources of all kinds in a volatile political environment marked
by authoritarian traditions that do not handle ethno-regional diversity
very well. As important is that both régimes and their leading élites are
still undemocratic and perhaps also sectarian: acting on behalf not of
the nation but for their own, limited, constituency. Judging from thé
news reaching us daily, they do not have a System of meaningful political
communication with thé population, and do not know — or worse,
perhaps do not really care — how to handle the local people's interests
or how to deal with 'minorities' in a proper manner. As is the case in
developed, post-industrial societies, thé challenge of multi-ethnicity or
'multi-culturalism' is unresolved in thé Horn, although on another level.
The différence is that in Northeast Africa violence and intimidation are
more consciously and openly used as ingrédients in thé political process.
This societal and political instability will only be lessened if thé two
governments in power review their System of governance and
significantly reform to become more nationally inclusive.
To assess the context of thé current political dynamics in thé Horn,
the focus hère is on some of thé social developments 'on thé ground',
and on thé psycho-social impact of the war on local people and local
society. While 'thé border' has not been the main issue causing thé war,
it will become a focus of negotiation and of concern in the period to
corne. The thesis of this article is that thé impending création of an iron-
clad, physical border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in an area of trans-
(2) The then Italian Foreign Minister Rino Serri even said in December 2000 that thé
peace accord was "...an important contribution to thé stabiiity of thé région" — a very
optimistic view. Amazing also was the eagerness of the World Bank and other donor
institutions for renewed financial aid with few conditions attached. On 6 December 2000
already, a press release was made announcing a U$ 400 million aid package to Ethiopia for
post-war recovery.
(3) See M. OTTAWAY, Africa's new leaders: democracy or state reconstruction?
Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, pp. 138.
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border contacts and shared local identities, will yield a new element of
instability. Such a border may further divide or redefine local
(ethnie/régional) groups, and provide material reasons to argue about
and exploit différence, created or not, in the economie, political and
cultural sphères. Ironically, the coming création and solidification of this
border — which is inévitable at the present historical juncture of two
separate states — is reminiscent of the classic Western colonialist scheme
in Africa of dividing contiguous areas of ethnie groups or peoples
without regard to their interests and local patterns of life. Predictable
arguments will keep on arising over this, and while the situation on both
sides will be kept in check with military repression, a problem is being
created that will come back sooner or later.
A secondary thesis is that the impact of the United Nations Mission
for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE; in place since December 2000) on the
process of peace-building remains very limited. UNMEE is dealing with
immédiate security matters, with patrolling the front-line area, with the
liaising between the two armies and administrations, and with negotiating
the emerging différences relating to the military situation and the
temporary security zone. They do not — are indeed prohibited to do so
under their mandate — médiate between the people or between state
authorities and local inhabitants in the area, and neither provide médical
aid, assist resettlement and rehabilitation, etc.
A complicating factor of the entire conflict is that it has become
psychologically deeply rooted in the minds of the common people. This
element cannot be underestimated, and is evident from all statements of
victims, ex-prisoners of war, and the displaced. The nature of the
violence perpetrated in this two-year war has sunk in deep into the public
consciousness of the common people, especially, it seems, in Ethiopia
after the return of victims (4), who tell taies of humiliation, suffering and
violence. The deep antipathy, and often hatred, now generaled is a social
f act, which will have serious conséquences. Of course not the violence
in battle but the often unspeakable abuses against civilians that created
the deep resentment, also among people with no interest in politics and
no commitment to yet another war: the expulsions of each other's
citizens, the arbitrary killings and disappearance of people, the robbing
of labour migrants of all of their possessions and savings, the internment
(4) NlTA BHALLA, Ethiopian refugees' atrocity tales, l July 2000 (http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_824000/824250.stm, and the PANA news
bulletin of 24 December 2000 (ICRC repatriates over 1,400 Ethiopians from Eritrea).
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of so-called 'enemy people' in camps under dismal conditions, the
physical abuse, and the torturing and humiliating of ordinary people.
Of course, a UN peace keeping force does not deal with such
sociological matters of people's traumas, expériences of suffering, and
resentful attitudes during or after the war situation, and one also wonders
how the national governments are going to deal with these. However,
they have to be dealt with in order to contribute to long-term
reconciliation or peace-making.
The forgotten people
With this term I mean the people who live or lived in the war area
on both sides of the border, and few of whom were soldiers in the two
armies. The larger part of this local population was displaced in the past
two years from their ancestral lands. It started in May 1998 when
thousands of Ethiopians were chased out or fleeing from the Badme,
Zalambessa, Ts'orona and Bure areas. In the course of the fighting, an
estimated total of 360,000 people was displaced, most of them on the
Eritrean side. Later, in February 1999 and May 2000 with the big
Ethiopian offensives, reputedly more than 600,000 people on the
Eritrean side were harassed and displaced. A few hundred thousand
returned relatively soon, but in December 2000 an estimated 350,000
were still in makeshift camps and other temporary dwellings. On the
Ethiopian side, another 300,000 were displaced. Though the numbers
declined subsequently, the situation is still not normalized. The people
affected received assistance from international organizations (UNHCR,
WFP, a.o.), but this was woefully inadequate, and despair among those
still displaced is rising. In the past two-and-a-half years, these groups
have received little attention from the international Community or from
their government for future rehabilitation. As the borders of the
'temporary security zone' (Tsz) of 25 kilomètres deep along the entire
border are still not officially determined as of September 2001, people
cannot return there.
Perhaps the lot of these displaced civilians is the real tragedy and
one of the long-term challenges of the conflict. Their areas and homes
are destroyed, their fields, herds and food stocks lost, but they must
some day return and rebuild their societies. They probably also have to
be brokers in peace, because they live or lived in the frontier area and
of necessity have developed trans-frontier relations. They were
pastoralists and traders crossing the line, they visited each other's
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markets, they had relatives across the border. The question is whether
they can and when they will be encouraged to do so again. These people
are from various backgrounds, and remarkably little is known about their
societies and recent histories. Neither have they been discussed in the
context of the current conflict. Among the main groups are:
a. the Afar, a group of about a million people, speaking a Cushitic
language, and predominantly nomadic camel pastoralists in (semi)arid
areas. An unknown number (perhaps about a 100,000) live in East
Eritrea. The Assab area is part of their traditional habitat. .
b. the Irob, a partly Ethiopian-Orthodox and partly Catholic
community of some 25 to 30,000 people, originally Saho-speaking
people. Saho is a Cushitic language also spoken by the Saho pastoralists
in Eritrea. Most of the Irob live in Ethiopia. Under Eritrean occupation
from May 1998 to June 2000, many were chased away or forced to
become Eritrean citizens (the village of Waratle is a known case, in July
1998). In July 1999, an Irob refugee camp in Magaoma in Tigray was
shelled by the Eritrean army, causing injury and death.
c. Kunama, a ca. 100,000-strong indigenous community, partly
Muslim, Protestant-Christian and traditional-religious (the majority).
About 7,000 to 10,000 of them live in Ethiopia. They speak a Nilo-
Saharan language. Kunama are a self-conscious, but open and tolerant
people, with cultural traditions rather divergent from Tigrinya-speakers
and others. They live of mixed agriculture, pastoralism, and trade and
are known for their matrilineal descent system and complex ritual life.
They were in the crossfire since May 1998 and suffered heavily. Many
of the towns in their area, like Barentu, Haykota, Shambukko and
Dukinbia, were seriously damaged by heavy Ethiopian shelling and
bombing (also churches) in the February-April 1999 fighting and in the
May-June 2000 offensive, during which several thousands fled to
Ethiopia.
d. In areas around the central war front (e.g., Zalambessa), the
population is mostly formed by the Tigrinya-speaking highlanders, the
population group from whose ranks the two regimes in Ethiopia and
Eritrea are mainly drawn. Like the previous groups, they are on both
sides of the border. The fighting displaced up to 250,000 of them.
The war was mainly fought on the territory of these groups. The
Afar, Kunama and Irob are more or less distinct minority (ethnie) groups
who have lived in the area since âges. Being minorities, they already had
a hard time under the two regimes in the pre-war situation: they were
politically marginalized and lived under domination. Especially for the
Kunama the situation was difficult: much of their lands were gradually
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taken for resettlement of other groups, they were 'fined' for allegedly
giving support to small rebel groups, their culturai traditions were
slighted and devalued, and they were not ruled by their own
représentatives.
The armed conflict itself starled in the Kunama area in May 1998.
The Ethiopian village of Badme was named after the Badumma plam,
where Kunama traditionally herded their livestock and practised some
agriculture. Kunama traders, who regularly crossed to trade with their
brethren across the line and visit market towns in Tigray, ignored the
colonial border that was drawn (but not demarcated) in 1890.
In and after the war, these local populations were affected in a
number of ways:
- they were direct war victims, not only as conscripted soldiers, but
many because they were kidnapped, abused or killed by the invading army.
- there was large-scale displacement of people and massive loss of
life and property in the occupied areas, both within Ethiopia and in May
2000 in Eritrea. Tens of thousands, soldiers as well as civilians from the
above groups, also fled to Sudan.
- détention of innocent people, many of whom still unaccounted
for. In the case of Eritrea, there are crédible reports of sévère pressure
the past year on the Kunama people (arrests and disappearance of
leaders, very tight security that seriously hampers daily life in the villages)
who did not show the 'expected amount of enmity' vis-à-vis the
Ethiopians when the latter occupied their area. (5)
- purposive destruction of the civilian, administrative and economie
infrastructure. This started in Badme, Zalambessa, and the Irob country:
churches, schools, houses, government buildings were desecrated, looted
and destroyed. The Ethiopian revenge came in May 2000 when in the
wake of the blitz offensive Barentu, Tessenai, Haykota and other places
were razed to the ground, and shops and industries like the big Eritrean
textile miU in AH Gidir blown up.
- there was serious environmental destruction: massive
deforestation to make trenches of several hundred kilomètres, the
burning of fields and forests, the destruction, e.g., in the Irob area, of
indigenous irrigation Systems, the pollution of the area with oil, waste
and armory rubbish.
(5) A website of Kunama expatriâtes with alarming news on the situation of the Kunama
in western Eritrea is: www.ndh.net/home/kunama.
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- the area still suffers from extensive mining of the fields, pasture
lands and forested areas of the people, so that normal life, farming and
herding cannot be done safely in the coming years.
The war practices of both sides have contributed to the création of
deep antipathy and hate towards the other. Traders who see their shops
looted and wantonly destroyed, or people who witness their loved ones
humiliated, abused, raped or killed, develop a burning resentment that
will spoil relations for a long time to come. The enmity has definitely
sunk down to the level of the common people and has been
'internalized'. Indeed, emotional enmity and scorn were purposely
created by Eritrean and subsequently by Ethiopian war policy on the
ground. This is one of the most disturbing results of the conflict and it
seemed to be a clear policy, imposed by the two regimes. The rationale
was again to 'create différence' and to anchor it psychologically. It is a
sad job to analyze the quite répulsive discourse of ethno-national
Stereotyping and insulting that has gone on during this war.
Local people and the current peace deal
The above problems of these local people as a result of this war
have not even begun to be addressed under the current peace deal. The
text of the December 12 agreement refers to them in the context of
Article 2, on prisoners of war, and in Article 4, on the Claims
Commission, that will deal with the claims to compensation for injury,
and lost or destroyed property by the governments and nationals,
including civilians (to be submitted within one year after the signing of
the 12 December 2000 accord). In practical terms, it will be very difficult
for individuals of these local groups to file claims, as many of them are
still displaced and are illiterate, and as the governments will be in control
of this process.
Furthermore, Article 3 of the accord, on the boundary delineation,
refers to a potential future problem in that the official border, largely
following the former Italian colonial line, will run through the territory
of four of the groups mentioned (Afar, Kunama, Irob and Tigrinya-
speakers), and who may not feel happy to be divided and even see their
livelihood threatened (fields, pasture, water points, market access).
The UNMEE does hardly deal with the local populations, whom they
do not know much about. When they are allowed to return, the UNMEE
units may give some logistical assistance, but any deep involvement is
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beyond their mandate It is also likely that the Ethiopian and Eritrean
governments will try to 'use' the UNMEE to restore their grip on the local
population. There has been a report by Kunama (6) that the Jordanian
UNMEE contingent in Eritrea was causing serious trouble for the local
people.
Even in the event of an acceptable peace deal, there are problems
with the political formulae in both countries to deal with legitimate
demands from these minority groups. Ethiopia has chosen to emphasize
ethnicity for all political, educational and economie purposes, which
leads to unnecessary oppositions and to undue 'ethnie compétition' for
resources (e.g, state funds), while Eritrea follows a kind of 1950s unitary,
forced 'national integration'-model that tends to bulldozer ethnie
différences and the needs of certain of these groups, favouring one or
two majority groups. As the groups on whose land the war was fought
were minorities that were already neglected in national policy, there is
no reason to expect a real change.
Local people as element of instability? Elements of resentment and revolt
There are reportedly about ten rebel or opposition movements
existing in the border area. Many of them date from before the recent
war, and some even from before Eritrean independence in 1991 (since
about year most are in a national front, the Alliance of Eritrean
Democratie Forces). Most, except the last two, have some sort of ethno-
regional basis. They are:
* the Afar Revolutionary Democratie Unity Front (AKDUF), a group
seeking the unification of the Afar area, and inclusion of the Eritrean
Afar into an Ethiopia-affiliated Afar Regional State. ARDUF gave out a
press statement on 23 June 2000, saying that they objected to the
stationing of 'foreign troops' (meaning peacekeeping forces) on their
land. They see the area of the port city Assab as their land as well. The
Ugugomo militia of this organization is, however, not a military factor to
reckon with.
* the Red Sea Afar Movement. This is also an Afar organization,
but smaller.
* the Democratie Front for the Liberation of Setit and Cash, a
(6) See www.meskerem.net/kunama.htm
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small and mihtarily not active movement, with some support among the
Kunama,
* the Democratie Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean
Kunama, also a small group without an armed présence,
* the Akkele-Guzay People's Movement (also known as Haika, a
small group from the Eritrean Akkele-Guzay région, but with no
organized structure. Most of its leaders are outside Eritrea). They have
objections to the unquestioned inclusion of Akkele-Guzay into
independent Eritrea. (7)
* the Democratie Movement for the Liberation of Eritrea (or
Demahai, a small opposition movement among Tigrinya-speakers,
supported by Ethiopia), and
* the Eritrean Liberation Front (or Jebha, the oldest front, set up
in 1960 and which has its support largely among north-western Islamic
groups in Eritrea and among Eritreans in Sudan). It has three off-shoots,
the ELF-Rc (or 'Revolutionary Command'), known as Sagem, the ELF-
Gc (General Command) and the ELF-Cc (Central Command).
There are also opposition groups (based mainly in Sudan) with a
religious agenda, such as the Eritrean Jihad Movement. lts programme
is exclusivist, externally inspired, and will not appeal to a large section
of the population. As is well-known, some of Ethiopia's armed opposition
movements are not in the border area but in the south and west of the
country
The above groups emerged from dissatisfaction with political and
economie developments in Eritrea and Ethiopia before the war, and of
course, the conduct of the war, the horrifie human suffering and material
destruction have not made them less relevant. Some were already created
by a government (e.g., the Demahai by the Ethiopian government,
probably already by TPLF). However, they appear not to have a
significant military rôle to play. That they exist and are trying to become
more active is due to the fact that political représentation and
communication of local interests within the current two political Systems
is still not guaranteed.
To pre-empt these movements, it would be necessary to draw them
into the political process in both countries in some way or other. This
is one of the challenges of the post-war situation, and the regimes may
(7) Leadership of the PFDJ (EPLF) is said to be mainly formed by people from Sera'e
and Hamaslen régions
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of course opt for repression and violence, as bas largely been the case
up to now, but that would destabilize thé peace and reconstruction
efforts and break down a constituency of support that is sorely needed
in a border area.
The border as construct
In a situation where people are so similar as in thé war area, and
where other, political, issues have provoked the conflict, the border can
only be perceived as a construct. Although independent Eritrea needs a
border, it is in part a political création to emphasize 'différence'. The
war, allegedly to form 'the right border', had the effect — intended or
not — to put Eritrea firmly on thé map as an independent polity and
as a counterweight to Ethiopia, also in thé économie sensé. Solidified
political séparation will indeed corne out of the current negotiations and
the delineation process. But for the local people it will probably be a
missed opportunity: they will not be involved in the process and some
will not be given a chance to choose where to belong. The construct
will thus become a harsh reality and an effective divisive element within
the various peoples involved (Irob, Kunama, Afar). This process has for
historical reasons already happened with the Tigrinya-speakers of
Northern Ethiopia: the Eritrean Tigrinya and the Tigray-Ethiopian
Tigrinya, who were in a previous génération one speech community made
up of several regional groups. (8) They now have dissociated themselves
so much from their common socio-cultural and linguistic héritage that
they even start denying that they were or are very similar. While political
realities since the Italian colonial venture have indeed produced this, the
ideological effort to consciously buttress the division is still going on,
sometimes in bizarre and historically dubious forms. Though the border
is a construct, and not even the real issue of the conflict, it will also
become an economie and social reality apart from a political one, and
perhaps as divisive.
(8) See for instance, ALEMSEGED ABBAY, Identüy jilted or reimagmmg identity? The
dwergent paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan nationalist struggles, Lawrenceville, NJ and
Asmara, Red Sea Press, 1998, pp. 250. For an historical analysis see also: MESFIN ÀRAYA,
Eritrea 1941-52, the failure of the émergence of the natwn-state, New York, City University of
New York, Ph.D. dissertation, 1988, pp. 302.
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Elements of hope in the post-war condition?
In view of the fragility of legitimate governance in the Horn, it is
difficult to foster much hope if the interests of the local societies/groups
are bypassed. The current peace agreement make it clear that the political
concerns of regime maintenance in both countries — seeing their
ultimate mutual dependency despite all that happened — take
precedence over everything else, but at the péril of maintaining instability
in the border areas and ignoring local needs.
This, incidentally, also applies to the current international peace
mission, the UNMEE. They would be wise not to bypass local people, but
indicate ways of co-operation beyond the political and military agenda
set by the two regimes. That the UNMEE will have trouble in doing so
is indicated by the letter of Ethiopia's UN ambassador (of 21 November
2000) as well as the press statement of the Irob community in the USA
(14 December 2000), protesting the first UNMEE référence map (9) of the
Temporary Security Zone (prepared by the UN Cartographie Unit) that
included the towns of Zalambessa and Alitena within Eritrean territory.
In the course of 2001, the Irob of the Zalambessa area came to feel more
alienated from the Ethiopian government, which was seen as not
representing their rights properly. (10) Several Kunama groups have
expressed fear of being unduly divided. They are' very critical of the
record of both the Eritrean government and the UNMEE, whose
contingent did not relate well to the local Kunama.
The border people thus may hold a key to the future. Can they be
mediators in daily economie and social contacts, or better, will they be
allowed to do so, and to conduct their normal trans-border contacts?
They are connected by kinship bonds, way of life and economie interests
(trade, movements of livestock). In the long run, it is these people who
must be allowed to contribute to a redéfinition of the border as a relative
thing. It may have been created to produce (political) différence, but
only with a major ideological and political effort by the authorities on
both sides can the people be really divided by it and internalize its
existence as a line defining 'identities'. This would be an unfortunate
development. Hence, the border is best construed around the socio-
(9) No. 4150/Rev.I (of September 2000). It was not an official map. As of November
2001, still no map was issued.
(10) See: Ad hoc Committee of Zalambesa-Irob Region, Mêles' Regime Abandons
Zalambesa, a statement issued on 9 September 2001 (zalambesa_kob@yahoo.com).
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economie, cultural and developmental needs of the people in the area.
This would contribute to defusing tensions.
One year after the agreement the question of assisting and
Consulting the local populations on whose territories t'^ij fought,
assessing their needs in terms of trans-border contacts, anci allowing
them to rebuild a viable society, across the border line is still unresolved.
Lines of national-political identity will supersede those of social and
cultural solidarity, at least in this area, thus affirming the hegemonie
claims of the two states, who have declared repeatedly that, with the
current political leaderships in place, normalization is unlikely to occur.
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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article veut traiter de quelques effets sociales et politiques du conflit erythréo-
éthiopien dans la zone frontalière depuis décembre 2000. Il s'agit surtout de la population et
de la société locale dans le contexte de la situation post-guerre.
L'auteur affirme que la création immanente d'une frontière physique et rigide entre
l'Ethiopie et l'Erythrée, apparemment voulu par les deux gouvernements, servira à produire
un élément d'instabilité additionnel dans une région marquée, traditionellement, par des
relations trans-frontalières et des identités et des intérêts partagés. Tandis que les questions
de frontière n'étaient pas la cause principale de la guerre, cette frontière devient maintenant
le bout de négociation et de discorde. Une frontière rigide contribuera à antagoniser les
groupes ethniques/régionales locales, et fournira des raisons matérielles pour des différends
permanents sur les 'différences', artificielles ou non, dans les domaines économique, sociale
et culturelle. En plus, il n'y a guère d'indication que les gouvernements en question vont
s'occuper de façon satisfaisante des intérêts des peuples de la zone frontalière.
EIASSUNTO
L'articolo analizza gli effetti sociali e politici del conflitto tra Eritrea ed Etiopia
verificatesi nella zona cli frontiera a partire dal dicembre 2000 con particolare riguardo ai
problemi délia société locale nel conteste post-bellico.
L'autore afferma ehe la creazione immanente di un confine fisico e rigido tra i due
paesi, apparentemente voluto da ambedue i governi, provocherà un ulteriore elemento di
instabilità in una regione segnata, per tradizione, da rapporti di frontiera e da identità e
interessi condivisi.
Considerato ehe i problemi di confine non erano la causa principale délia guerra, la
frontiera diventa ora il nodo principale del negoziato e délia discordia. Un confine rigido
contribuirà a rendere antagonisti i gruppi etnici regionali locali provocando scontri permanent!
sulle differenze, artificiali e non, ehe esistono nel campo economico, sociale e culturale. Inoltre
non vi è nessuna indicazione ehe i governi in questione vogliano occuparsi realmente degli
interressi délie popolazioni délia zona di confine.
